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Abstract—Four strategies for upset protection in NCO (Nu-
merically controlled oscillator) generators are presented and
compared in this paper1. This work is motivated by the
increased prevalence of single event upsets due to pro-
cess/voltage/temperature variations coupled with the increased
advancement of CMOS technology. The occurrence of these
upsets in the GPS context (the system under the test in this
paper) can lead to a loss of the GPS signal tracking, then
the corresponding satellite signal must be re-acquired resulting
in high energy expenditure and time delay. It can result also
in a corrupted position given by the GPS receiver. Results
of experiment using a GPS receiver design are presented in
this paper to evaluate the performance of proposed methods.
This work can be extended and generated to any system using
feedback loops information.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, increased advancement of CMOS
technology coupled with process/voltage/temperature (PVT)
variations, have made internal upsets on devices more frequent
[1], [2]. These upsets manifest as momentary fault in the
device’s behavior and their occurrence can significantly affect
the circuit performance and output states. Therefore, it is
extremely important to protect systems from fault’s impact
to achieve acceptable reliability and maintain low complex-
ity and cost. Fault tolerance has been studied for mobile
systems to build mobile devices more robust to transient
errors due to PVT variations. For example, the author of
[3] proposed some resilience techniques for double-iterative
multiple-input multiple-output bit-interleaved coded modula-
tion (MIMO BICM) receivers. These techniques have been
realized on different layers of abstraction in order to have a
mutual trade-off of system performance, hardware reliability
and implementation complexity.
Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers are extensively
used in mobile context, and there is motivation to minimize
power consumption and maximize battery life in these devices.
Fault tolerance has been studied for data fusion in navigational
systems that incorporate GPS receivers along with other sensor
devices. For example, the authors of [4] consider an intelligent
data fusion system to compensate for delayed or erroneous
GPS data due to acquisition loss or signal obstruction. In
1This work has received a French government support granted to the
COMIN Labs excellence laboratory and managed by the National Research
Agency in the ”Investing for the Future” program under reference ANR-10-
LABX-07-01.
[5], strategies have been proposed and evaluated for upset
protection in Gold sequence generators. Paper [6] presents two
approaches to deal with internal logic upsets inside correlation
process used in the tracking process of GPS receivers.
GPS receivers use Numerically Controlled Oscillators
(NCO) to produce a local copy of the carrier frequency offset
(due to Doppler offset) of incoming satellite signals. When the
NCO output is corrupted, distance measurements in the GPS
receiver are disturbed and this leads to a faulty localization
of the receiver. This problem can be mitigated if the NCO is
protected. In this context, this paper presents four solutions to
make the NCO module more robust to upsets and evaluates
those solutions in terms of their performance. This work can
be generated for any NCO in feedback loop systems. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II gives
detailed information in a compact form about the GPS receiver
architecture and rules of NCO generators. Sec. III presents the
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) method. Sec. IV, V and
VI describe three methods using the modular redundancy. Sec.
VII provides synthesis and performance results. Finally Sec.
VIII offers conclusions.
II. GPS SIGNAL PROCESSING
GPS is the US Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
that provides free positioning and timing service. Each GPS
satellite broadcasts a navigation message at 50 bits/s using
the Code Division multiple Access (CDMA) technology. The
analytical expression of the transmitted signal of a satellite k
is
ek(t) = ck(t) dk(t) e
(2pijfL1t)
, where:
• dk(t): navigation message of the kth satellite;
• ck(t): kth Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) satellite code with a
Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) modulation (i.e. ck ∈
{−1, 1});
• fL1 : the carrier frequency in the L1 GPS Band (Open
Sevice).
At least four GPS satellites are needed for a GPS receiver
to be able to compute the position in time and space. The
incoming digital GPS signal in the receiver is first demodulated
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Fig. 1. Generic digital receiver channel block diagram
frequency), and, after a bandpass filter, sampled at a frequency








• θk = 2piT
(
fd(k)(nT ) + FI
)
,
• Ak: Attenuation parameter of kth satellite signal,
• τk: Propagation delay between satellite k and receiver,
• fd(k): Doppler frequency of satellite k,
• {1..K}: Set of satellites visible at time n,
• T : Sampling period (T = 0.25 µs),
• w(n): additive white Gaussian noise.
For each GPS satellite visible in view, the GPS receiver tries to
extract the corresponding navigation message. To do so, there
are two essential and sequential processes: the acquisition and
tracking process. The acquisition process is the process by
which the receiver identifies which satellites are in view. It is
a a three-dimensional search to determine the GPS satellite
identifier (i.e the C/A code ck associated to the satellite),
code phase (represented by τ˜ ), and carrier frequency offset
due to Doppler effect (represented by f˜d). Since satellites
are in continuous motion, distances between satellites and the
receiver are dynamic. The carrier frequency of the received
signal is also constantly changing in time due to Doppler
shifts. Therefore, once the acquisition process is accomplished,
GPS signals have to be tracked over time.
Each acquired satellite will be tracked by a unique tracking
channel. A simplified representation of the channel tracking
module is given in Fig. 1. The main objective of each
channel tracking module is to extract the navigation message
of the corresponding GPS satellite. To do that, using estimated
parameters f˜d and τ˜ , the GPS receiver produces a local copy
of the C/A code (via the Gold Code generators) and the carrier
frequency (via the NCO component). Then, a comparison
between locally generated signals and incoming signals, using
a correlation process and for a period of 10ms, is made.
C/A codes belongs to the family of Gold Pseudo Random
Noise (PRN) sequences. Hence codes of all GPS satellites
are orthogonal. Then, the 10ms integrator output for the ath




s(n) ca(nT − τ˜a(nT )) e−j(θ˜an+ϕ˜a) (2)
Thus, a perfect time alignment (τ˜a = τa) and a perfect
frequency and phase alignment (θ˜a = θa and ϕ˜a = ϕa)
implies, according to (1) and (2), that d˜a(`) = da(`). The sum-
mation over 10ms in (2) corresponds to the accumulation of
40,000 values (4MHz clock during 10ms)2. Taking in account
the correlation function result, the estimate of the Doppler
frequency (f˜d) and the delay (τ˜ ) is made via discriminators
and filters. The carrier loop filter and the carrier discriminator
produce an accurate estimate of the Doppler offset of incoming
signals while the code loop filter and the code discriminator
produce an accurate estimate of the delay offset [7].
Fig. 2. NCO generator block diagram
Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the carrier loop NCO
and its sine and cosine mapping functions. The NCO carrier
receives at its input the estimated Doppler offset value θ.
The value of θ remains constant each 10ms (tracking loops
are operating at 100Hz). If we consider ψ the output of the
NCO carrier, ψ is produced each 0.25 µs (i.e at 4MHz) and
is defined as
∀n ψ(n) = ψ (n− 1) + θ (bn/Nsc) (3)
where bxc is the floor function of x and Ns is total number
of samples generated by the NCO in 10ms (Ns = 40000 in
the GPS context). If the NCO outputs are disturbed due to
logic internal upsets, then the corresponding carrier frequency
2Each bit of the navigation message have a duration of 20ms (50Hz bit
rate). Thus, assuming perfect bit timing synchronisation, da(`) is constant
while computing (2)
2
becomes corrupted, resulting in a loss of the GPS signal track-
ing. This problem can be mitigated if the NCO is protected by
an error corrector method. Next sections will present different
methods that can be proposed to protect the NCO carrier from
momentary errors.
III. TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANCY (TMR)
TMR is a classical solution for fault tolerance in electronic
systems [8]. It has been widely used for electronics in the
space and nuclear industries to ensure reliable operation [9].
In a TMR system, the original module (the adder + register
in this case) is replicated three times, and error correction is
achieved by a majority vote operation. We note that there are
several configurations, such as one-voter TMR, the triple-voter
TMR or the restorative-feedback TMR [10]. In this paper we




Fig. 3. NCO carrier with TMR protection
If an upset occurs in anyone of the three replicas, the other
two replicas can correct and mask the error. But once two of
the three replicas fail, an error will be generated in the system
and propagated over time. We note also that errors in the voter
are extremely harmful for the system because they will not be
corrected. To deal with these drawbacks, the triple-voter TMR
also triplicate the voters so that a vote error can be corrected
in a subsequent circuit stage.
IV. RENDEZ-VOUS CHECKING METHOD (RVC)
In a TMR system, the original module is replicated three
times and error correction is achieved by a majority vote
operation. In this case area and power consumption increase
of more than 300%. To design a NCO tolerant to transient
error with low complexity and cost we propose here to use
the assumption that the NCO input remains constant during
each 10ms. So from (3), we can deduce that:
∀` ∈ N ψ((`+ 1)Ns) = ψ(`Ns) +Ns θ(`) (4)
Based on (4), we add to the original architecture (i.e the adder
and the register) a correction module composed by a multiplier
and adder as configured in Fig. 4. At the end of each 10 ms, the
correction module produces a new output (ψc) by substituting
ψc in place of ψ in (4). The Rendez-vous Checking Method
will consist on a meeting (Rendez-vous) organised at the end
of each 10 ms to check the coherence of values between ψc
and ψo (where ψo is the output of the original module given
by substituting ψo in place of ψ in (3) ). Once an incoherence
(ψo 6= ψc) is declared, it is ψc that will be used later clocks.
Fig. 4. Rendez-vous checking method configuration
Fig. 5 illustrates how we are able to correct errors occurring
when the NCO is operating. However, when an error occurs
when the correction module is operating, an uncorrectable
failure results in the system. We have to note here that the
probability to have a faulty correction module is low once the
correction module output is computed during 10 ms.
Fig. 5. Correction of errors in RvC method; when an error occurs at time
step t1, it can be corrected at time at 20 ms thanks to the coorrect output of
the correction module.
V. TIME FREEZING METHOD (TF)
In order to make the NCO carrier generator more robust
against upset, the original module is duplicated. Then we use
a comparator to detect incoherence between replicas output.
Let’s consider :
• ψ(n): the output of the NCO at time step n
3
• ψ1(n): the output of Adder1 at time step n
• ψ2(n): the output of Adder2 at time step n
Once one of the two adders are faulty (i.e ψ1(n) 6= ψ2(n),
e = 1), the correct previous output of the NCO (i.e ψ(n− 1))
is used to feedback adders as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Time Freezing Method configuration
However, if the register R is faulty, the TF configuration
fails and errors will propagate over time in the tracking loops.
VI. ROBUST TIME FREEZING (RTF) METHOD
To deal with TF method drawbacks we propose in this
method to triplicate the register as shown in Fig. 7. The register
R in Fig. 7 is used to store the NCO output and to feedback
adders with the last correct output value of the NCO when
an incoherence between adders output is detected. As for the
TMR 3 Voter, any simple error can be detected and corrected
in the RTF configuration.
Fig. 7. Robust Time Freezing Method Configuration
VII. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we first define the method to assess the
quality of a GPS with a noisy NCO carrier. Then, all of the
described methods were evaluated and compared.
A. Quality of a noisy GPS receiver
The methodology used to evaluate the quality of the pro-
posed method is threefold:
• Use the front end of a GPS receiver to store incoming
GPS signal s(n) over a significant period of time (few
minutes).
• Process the stored input GPS signal with a reference
noiseless GPS receiver [11] to generate the set of suc-
cessive estimated positions X(p)p=1...Q.
• Replace the noiseless GPS receiver with a noisy GPS
receiver and process a Monte-Carlo simulation processing
N times the stored incoming GPS signal to generate sets
of noisy position X˜i(p)p=1..Q, i = 1..N .
Then, we can study the link between the model of error
injection, the hardware used to mitigate errors and the statisti-
cal difference between the noiseless GPS position X and the
noisy GPS position X˜ .
1) model of noise: The model of noise used in this paper
is very simple. For each active tracking module, every output
of the NCO module is assume to be exact with a probability
(1− p) or to be faulty with a probability p. In case of faulty
result, a random random is uniformly drawn between 0 and
2pi to replace the exact value.
2) Metric to evaluate the quality of the noisy GPS receiver:
Two metrics are used to evaluate the quality of the noisy




E(| X − X˜ |2) (5)
where p is the probability of the upsets’ injection model (noise)
at the output of the integrator 10 ms. This parameter gives
us an idea about how many meters, on average, the position
given by the noisy GPS is far from the position given by the
reference GPS. The second parameter is:
f(r, p) = Pr
(
| X − X˜ |> r
)
(6)
Given the probability of error injection, p, f(r, p) reflect the
probability that the noisy GPS receiver compute a distance at a
distance greater than r meter from the noiseless GPS receiver.
B. Evaluation Methods
All of the described methods were evaluated in term of
EQM and probability of an alignment of the reference position
as defined in (5) and (6). Fig. 8 compares the mean
square squared error (EQM) of different method. As we can
see from this figure (Fig. 8), Rendez-vous Checking Method
provides us a very important result (EQM < 10m) for the low
error probability but it lose its efficiency for the higher error
probability. Time Freezing Method and Robust Time Freezing
Method correction is more efficient than the TMR one voter
and they are very close to the TMR 3 voter. For example, for
a probability of upsets up to p = 10−2, RTF method gives an
error of the position of about 10 meters, 2 meters more than
the EQM for the TMR-3 Voter method. In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10
we fix the probability of upsets (p = 10−1, for p = 10−2
respectively) and we try to compute the probability to be far
from the reference position. For instance when p = 0.01, the
probability of been 10 m far from the reference position goes
from 0.42 (No correction mechanism is added to the NCO) to






















Fig. 8. EQM = f(p); When p = 10−1, EQM goes from 50 meters to an
orror in the position less than 1 meter using the TMR 3 Voter method.



















No Correction  p =0.1
TF method     p =0.1
RTF method  p =0.1
TMR 3 Voter  p =0.1
Fig. 9. The probability of the removal (in meters) from the reference position
when p = 10−1
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our results show an improvement in the probability of the
removal from the reference position and in term of EQM
with each methods introduced previously. For a small upset
probability, Rendez Vous Checking method provides an ac-
ceptable reliability for a low cost configuration. For a high
upset probability, Robust Time Freezing and Time Freezing
method provides the big interest for reducing errors in the
NCO carrier.
REFERENCES
[1] P. B. J. A. Jayanth Srinivasan, Sarita V. Adve, “The impact of tech-
nology scaling on lifetime reliability,” The International Conference on













No Correction  p =0.01
TF method     p =0.01
RTF method  p =0.01
TMR 3 Voter  p =0.01
Fig. 10. The probability of the removal (in meters) from the reference position
when p = 10−2
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN-04), 2004.
[2] S. Borkar, “Tackling variability and reliability challenges,” IEEE Design
and Test of Computers, vol. 23, no. 6, 2006.
[3] C. Gimmler-Dumont and N. Wehn, “A cross-layer reliability design
methodology for efcient, dependable wireless receivers,” ACM Trans-
actions on Embedded Computing Systems, vol. 13, no. 4, 2014.
[4] M. Jaradat and M. Abdel-Hafez, “Enhanced, delay dependent, intelligent
fusion for ins/gps navigation system,” Sensors Journal, IEEE, vol. 14,
no. 5, pp. 1545–1554, May 2014.
[5] C. W. Mohamed Mourad Hafidhi, Emmanuel Boutillon, “Reliable gold
code generators for gps receivers,” The International Midwest Sympo-
sium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS 2015), 2015.
[6] ——, “Reducing the impact of internal upsets inside the correlation
process in gps receivers,” submitted in Design and Architectures for
Signal and Image Processing (DASIP 2015), 2015.
[7] J. B.-Y. Tsui, Fundamentals of Global Positioning System Receivers.
Wiley-Interscience, 2000.
[8] R. E. Lyons and W. Vanderkulk, “The use of triple-modular redundancy
to improve computer reliability,” IBM J. Res. Dev., vol. 6, pp. 200–209,
1962.
[9] Y. Z. Yimao Cai and L. La, “Implementation of a reconfigurable
computing system for space applications,” System Science, Engineering
Design and Manufacturing Informatization (ICSEM), vol. 2, 2011.
[10] C. Winstead, A. Tejeda, E. Monzon, and Y. Luo, “Error correction via
restorative feedback in M-ary logic circuits,” J. of Mult. Valued Logic
and Soft Comp., vol. 23, no. 3–4, 2014.
[11] A. Dion, Personal communication. Institut Supe´rieur de l´ Ae´ronotique
et de l´ Espace (ISAE)., 2014.
5
